Touch the Elbow - Blogging the Civil War

The Seminar's Saturday morning session continues as Scott Hartwig, a Supervisory Park Ranger at Gettysburg, follows William Hewitt and steps up to present to his audience “The Gettysburg Campaign and Battle – An Eclectic Review.”

In order to answer questions as to why the Confederacy invaded Pennsylvania in 1863 and the resultant consequences, Hartwig suggested that one has to “start forward and work backwards.” Historians have tried to answer those questions over the span of decades and have arrived at varying conclusions. Edward Stackpole, writing in 1956, saw the invasion as “a bold stroke to win the war” and “to win European recognition” for the Confederacy.



Clifford Dowdy viewed it more simply. “Lee’s practical reason was to victualize his army” and moved north for what became “the largest commissary raid in history.” Glenn Tucker argued that with the war nearly lost in the West, victory had to be achieved in the eastern theater. The Gettysburg campaign “offered an opportunity to win the war in one stroke;" a similar opportunity to make New York City and Philadelphia nervous; a political opportunity to increase Northern civilian demands for peace; and a final opportunity to earn coveted European recognition. Kent Masterson Brown’s “Retreat from Gettysburg” outlined dual objectives, "the need to feed and equip the army", as well as "keeping the army intact.”

Turning to what Confederates themselves said, Hartwig cited James Longstreet, who wrote in the 1880’s that Gettysburg was strictly a defensive campaign and its objective was not to deliver offensive battle. As Hartwig pointed out, what was missing from Longstreet’s statement was the absence of European recognition. Armistead Law stated that Lee’s plans were “fully developed” before the invasion, that the commanding general had, in fact, "marked Gettysburg on a map," and was convinced the best course of action was to invade above the Mason-Dixon line. Strategically mountains would shield his movements, enabling him to keep his lines of communication open, while the movement would allow for the gathering of much needed supplies.

Porter Alexander, who commanded Longstreet's First Corps artillery, wrote in his book "Fighting for the Confederacy" that "Lee wanted a fight, wherever it occurred along the way." Another officer stated the primary purpose was "to transfer the war to Northern soil," while still another chimed in that Lee wanted to "relieve pressure in northern Virginia, while "increasing Northern opposition to the war." Former Colonel Charles Marshall wrote in his memoirs "Lee's Aide-de-Camp," the primary objectives were to "keep the enemy at a distance from Richmond," and "transfer the war." Lee was fully aware of the possibilities that "victory north of the Potomac would change the war" and possibly "save Vicksburg." While an invasion would strengthen Northern peace parties, of critical concern was the "waning manpower of the Confederacy"and its impact on the South's ability to continue an effective fight in a protracted war if a sudden thrust northward were not implemented.

Lee provided his own answers during an April 1868 interview with William Allan, declaring that he "did not intend to give battle in Pennsylvania." His intention was to "draw the enemy away from the Rappahannock line," but clearly had "no idea of a permanent occupation of Pennsylvania." He was hopeful of staying for the summer, though, and envisioned returning to Virginia in the fall. The objectives then were to "move about," "threaten cities," all the while avoiding the risk of a large scale battle.

Lee's June 1863 corresponence stands as a testiment to his mindset. On June 8th he wrote to Jefferson Davis that he was "aware of the dangers in taking the offensive, but it was worth a try." On the 20th he urged General William E. Jones to attack the enemy in West Virginia, calculating that "maybe it was his best shot at the enemy." In a June 22nd communique to Richard Ewell, Lee judged that a move north would depend on the quantity of supplies available in the North. If supplies were abundant enough beyond merely sustaining Ewell's Corps, he "would then send in the rest of the army." According to Hartwig, "Lee had no idea if his army could forage off the land."

On the 23rd, again to Davis, Lee urged that the deep South be stripped of troops and they be used to bolster his army. If successful with his invasion, Lee surmised the Union "might be compelled" to withdraw their troops in the West. Hartwig saw this as clear evidence that Lee recognized the "great and growing possibilities" of his invasion plan. Two days later he speculated in another letter to Davis that bringing the war to the Northern people would have a postive impact on a growing peace movement there and, at the least, if the Army of Northern Virginia couldn't do anything else it could certainly influence upcoming elections. Lee reiterated his objectives in his final report on Gettysburg, written eleven months afterwards, that his was an attempt "to draw out the enemy," and "not his intention to bring on a general battle."

By examining Lee's correspondence and reports, Hartwig drew his own conclusions as to why Lee invaded the North. One can conclusively "rule out" the European recognition angle and "rule out the commissary raid" theory. The evidence points to a five fold masterplan, viz, "to draw the enemy away from Richmond and the Rappahannock line," "to disrupt the enemy's plans for its summer campaign," to "encourage the Northern peace movement," to "inflict whatever damage possible and whatever is permitted," including, for example the capture of Harrisburg, and finally, Lee's fear that the opportunity to finally crush the Union army might not ever present itself again.

As varied as the opinions as to why Lee moved north are the assessments of the consequences borne by the Army of Northern Virginia. Journalist William Swinton penned that Gettysburg represented "the crisis of the war" and was "the salvation of the North." The Comte de Paris felt Gettysburg "propelled the war into a new phase." Jefferson Davis remarked that the batle "justifies the amount of attention its achieved," while Kent Masterson Brown concluded Lee's retreat "restored the balance of power," while adding, "Gettysburg can't be viewed as the seminal point of the war." Clifford Dowdy reasoned that Gettysburg "put the Army of Northern Virginia and the Confederacy on a road that led directly to Appomattox." Others, though, offer contrary views, that the engagement "had no impact on ending the war." Gary Gallagher, for one, has written "the Confederate army recovered very quickly" and that "the Southern people recovered from the twin defeats" inflicted at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

The impact of that defeat at Gettysburg is perhaps best entrusted to the thoughts and reactions of Private Ross Stillwell of Georgia and Robert E. Lee himself. On July 6th Lee wrote Jefferson Davis that his backward movement was "a withdrawal." Two days later he described the army's condition as "good," and voiced optimism, confident that his army could be reinforced, while "the fortitude of the army was not shaken." On July 12th he lamented to his wife that his "success at Gettysburg was not as great as he expected," and shared with Davis that he did "everything that could have been could have been reasonably expected." Fourteen days later he admitted to his wife that he was "sensing critcism" of his performance, while, on that same day, the 27th, he confessed to Davis that his "army needs to be recruited up and called for a general amnesty to bring troops back."

Lee's confidence as commanding general seemed to have eroded by July 29th, when he acknowledged for the very first time in a letter to Davis "the damage done in the battle and during his retreat," making specific reference to the more than "5,000 well men traveling with the ambulance train." Psychologically he bottomed out when he offered his resignation on August 8th and turned bombastic when nine days after that he called for rigid enforcement of the death penalty for deserters. He clearly saw an August 11th amnesty decree as an abject failure. Men stayed at home while the flood of men unlawfully leaving the ranks continued unabated.

Private Stillwell exuded unbridled confidence during the march toward and into Pennsylania and even shortly after the battle, as evidenced by his letters home. Writting on June 20th he informed his wife he was "in good heart," and "we will win the war." On the 26th he predicted the capture of Harrisburg and even after the fight, on July 10th, his morale remained uplifted. He even wrote "the Union had retreated." Hartwig pointed out that Stillwell's was not an isolated opinion among the Confederate ranks. The majority, in fact, shared that same view. Stillwell did admit, though, in the next sentence that his regiment "had shrunk to the size of a company." Still later, in a moment of melancholia, he expressed fear "the whole army will be destroyed" and candidly admitted "I am discouraged." That discouragement only intensified when news of the fall of Vicksburg reached him. July 16th: "The army is much discouraged." Grasping for answers, Stillwell became "convinced that God was displeased by their Northern invasion."

The bloom was completely off the rose by July 19th. By then Stillwell was questioning himself as to whether he had a future and predicted "the war's end was in sight." On August 6th he discoursed on the suffering of the men around him, caused, in part, by long marches in the hot sun. As did Lee, his bottom seemingly occurred on August 13th when he spelled out that he "was not in good spirits," that men were deserting left and right, that people at home were discouraged, and rumors were sweeping through camp that North Carolina was on the verge of rejoining the Union. On a personal level Gettysburg proved to be a turning point for Stillwell. The reality that "it was going to be harder to win the war" had taken firm hold.