Touch the Elbow - Blogging the Civil War

Co-sponsored by the Gettysburg National Military Park and The Gettysburg Foundation, this bi-annual seminar, which this year focused on “Gettysburg: The Aftermath and The End of the Campaign,” has to be one of the best kept secrets going. I found out about the seminar by word- of-mouth only three weeks before the event and was fortunate to get in, because enrollment was limited to 250 participnts. I’m labeling the seminar a well kept secret, because in February I had put together a long list of conferences and seminars scheduled for around the country during the year and will give you a guess as to one didn’t that appear on that list.

The two-day seminar, held at the Gettysburg Hotel from Saturday, April 10 to Sunday morning, April 11th, drew its pool of speakers from National Park Service staff based primarily at Gettysburg. The Seminar has been a continuing affair for something like twenty-six years, so, if you do the math, that’s thirteen conferences. There will be a scaled back version in 2012, because all efforts will be focused on the following year. Hmmm, can’t imagine as to why.

The seminar was an incredible bargain; $90 worth of bargain for early registrants and $100 bucks to all of us who were late in forking over the fee. What everyone got in return were seven speakers spread out over two mornings, a choice of five different battlefield tours on Saturday afternoon, a Saturday evening reception at the Visitor’s Center, which included a buffet, a one act play, and, hold on to your hats, a behind the scenes peek at the Cyclorama that left everyone in total awe.

Reporting the seminar will encompass a number of different posts. This, the first, is aimed at whetting your appetites for what turned out to be a highly informative and interesting weekend, and one that already has me looking toward the future.

Welcoming remarks were offered to the 215 attendees by newly appointed Park Superintendent Bob Kirby. He reiterated the goals and mandates of the National Park Service, which included "relevancy, stewardship, education, and workforce enhancement." It's imperative for staff, in his mind, to become better educators in order to maintain the Service's other goals.



Retired Army Lt. Colonel William Hewitt was the first of seven speakers and opened with a talk dealing with the tactical Confederate retreat and Union pursuit following the battle of Gettysburg.


Confession: I've never studied military science, haven't ever participated in a staff ride, and admit ignorance of battlefield strategy during the Civil War. While it's not total mumbo jumbo, my simplistic overview is that strategy involved attempting to overwhelm the center of a defensive line with sheer numbers, or trying to outflank the flanks. But I suppose that's like reducing baseball to the following formula: pitcher throws ball, batter tries to hit ball. In it's very simplest terms, that is, in fact, the object of the game, but an interpretation that would have diehard fans burying their heads in their hands. Thus, bear with me to see how well I followed Hewitt's bouncing red ball.

By the time the Army of the Potomac and Army of Northern Virginia met at Gettysburg the average regiment had been reduced from 1,000 to 300 men. Those numbers were to be reduced even further by July 3rd and, by the 4th, Lee was forced into making a decision, whether to force more action or retreat to the safety of Virginia. When the latter decision became fixed in the minds of Lee and his subordinates, Meade, through his own lack of aggressive follow-up, allowed the Army of Northern Virginia to make a retrograde withdrawal.

For the losers in any battle there are, according to Hewitt, two types of withdrawal, one that's a forced retreat, the other a retrograde withdrawal, or a slow and deliberate pull back. Lee, in having just lost the battle, needed to re-establish his authority and gain control over his troops, while his troops needed to regain confidence in their commanders.

The organization for a retrograde withdrawal includes the establishment of a rear guard large enough to turn an enemy and may be lost to save the main body of the army, which is always within a half day march. Too, it allows for supply trains to "get out of the way" and time for halts to rest troops. The immediate problems facing a commander such as Lee would include the physical condition of his troops, preservation of order, and morale.

Retrograde withdrawals involve a waiting game and moving primarily at night to "get a march on the enemy." Methods include moving by a single route, but using as many roads as there are available, or moving by multiple routes separated by at least a one day's march. The key, though, is to "deceive the enemy about where you're headed."

Although his Corps commanders were intact and he had considered renewing the attack on July 4th, Lee "had little choice but to retreat toward the Falling Waters area." This movement, as it turned out, would be shielded by South Mountain. Lee's plan then was to move his trains of supplies and wounded under the charge of John Imoden, followed by the main body of troops, followed up the rear guard. If pressed directly by the enemy, the main body would be in position to turn and offer support. A.P. Hill's Third Corps formed the initial rear guard, however, throughout, Ewell's Second Corps alternated places with Hill's, while Longstreet's First Corps was always placed in the middle, with cavalry securing the flanks. Subjected to Federal cavalry attacks at crossing sites along the Potomac and along his route of withdrawal, Lee, in four days, only got as far as Hagerstown, where he halted to conduct reconnaissance.

The characteristics of a pursuit are to move quickly and securely, to directly pressure the enemy in order to slow its retreat, to "damage it all you can." With generals such as Hancock and Reynolds gone, Meade was faced with the question as to who was "going to lead the direct pressure force" and who was "going to lead the enveloping force." It was part of the decision making process Meade needed to make in order to establish a plan of pursuit. According to Hewitt, Meade was paralyzed, in part, by the word if; "if...if...then, we will not..."

When his plan of pursuit was finally established it consisted of clearing the town of Gettysburg in order to resupply, for Sedgwick to follow the Confederates, but not closely in order to determine if Lee wanted to fight or withdraw, and to partially shift his supply base to Frederick, Maryland. Sedgwick moved as instructed, but then inexplicably halted for more than 30 hours, thereby allowing Lee to widen the gap between himself and the main Union army. That latter army made small movements on July 5th and 6th, traveling a total of four miles, while on the 7th and 8th, in an effort to narrow Lee's lead, used forced marches of 15 miles or more each day. The halts and delays, the failure to press, violated a cardinal rule of pursuit. "Never allow an enemy to establish a defensive position. They get their equilibrium back. That's what Meade allowed."

In assessing each commander, Hewitt stated that Lee "reasserted his leadership and reestablished his confidence." Meade, who was "good on the defensive," "was not the right guy for pursuit" of the Confederate army. "Meade needed to seize the initiative by placing his army near enough to crossing sites to force Lee to attack." Hewitt opined simply enough that Lee's retreat was textbook material both in its planning and execution, while Meade contented himself with simply applying pressure with his cavalry.